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Abstract
The literature on political business cycles suggests that politicians systematically
manipulate economic conditions before elections. The literature on vote and popu-
larity functions suggests that economic conditions systematically aect election out-
comes. This paper integrates these two strands of literature. We use Rogo (1990)’s
model of the rational political business cycle to derive the two-way relationship be-
tween the win-margin of the incumbent politician and the size of the opportunistic
distortion of fiscal policy. This relationship is estimated, for a panel of 275 Por-
tuguese municipalities (from 1979 to 2001), as a system of simultaneous equations
(by FIML). The results clearly support the theoretical predictions: (1) Opportunism
pays o, leading to a larger win-margin for the incumbent; (2) incumbents behave
more opportunistically when they expect a close election race.
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ments, system estimation, Portugal.
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1 Introduction
To what extent are economic policies in democratic societies distorted by the competitive
struggle for votes? How strong is the impact of the economy on election results? These
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questions have puzzled researchers for a long time, but have tended to be investigated
separately. On the one hand, the literature on political business cycles (PBCs) has focused
on identifying distortions in macroeconomic and fiscal variables around election times.1
On the other hand, the literature on vote and popularity (VP) functions has focused on
identifying the impact of economic and fiscal conditions on election results.2 Yet, the
PBC and the VP function are intimately related: rational politicians would not attempt
to create a PBC if it did not help them win elections and rational voters would not base
their vote decisions on economic and fiscal conditions if it did not help them select better
politicians. The aim of the present paper is to bridge these two strands of literature
and to estimate jointly the VP function and the fiscal distortion created by opportunistic
politicians trying to win elections.
Research on electoral economics took o in the 1970’s with the seminal works of Good-
hart and Bhansali (1970), Mueller (1970), and Kramer (1971) on the VP function and
with the work of Nordhaus (1975) and Hibbs (1977) on political business cycles. Since
then, many papers have investigated similar issues, but tend to research the VP function
and the PBC independently. A notable exception in this first generation of papers is the
study by Frey and Schneider (1978) which highlighted the importance of analyzing the in-
terrelationship between the economy and the polity, by presenting estimates of popularity
functions for the US president along with government expenditure reaction functions that
took into account a re-election constraint capturing the popularity of the incumbent.
The rational expectations revolution brought new challenges to the literature since
rational voters cannot be systematically fooled one election after the other by opportunistic
politicians. New models were developed where the PBC resulted from asymmetries of
information between politicians and voters. Alesina (1987), for example, showed that pre-
election uncertainty about the ideology of the party to take o!ce after the election can
explain rational partisan cycles in macroeconomic aggregates. In rational opportunistic
models, such as Rogo and Sibert (1988) and Rogo (1990), incumbents signal their
1See Drazen (2000: 219-308), Mueller (2003: 429-471) and Paldam (1997) for overviews of this litera-
ture.
2See Nannestad and Paldam (1994) and Paldam (2004) for surveys.
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competence to the electorate by manipulating fiscal policy instruments before elections.3
The first generation of empirical papers on the political business cycle, based on Nord-
haus (1975) and Hibbs (1977), made use of national-level data on elections, policies, and
economic outcomes. With the introduction of rational expectations into the models, em-
pirical research shifted the focus to economic policy instruments, particularly to those of
fiscal policy. Following a suggestion by Rogo (1990: 33-34), a number of researchers have
looked for political business cycles using data for state and local elections.4 The interest
in electoral politics has recently been renewed, but most of the current discussion is about
which characteristics of a polity might support or discourage political business cycles. Shi
and Svensson (2006) present empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that the elec-
toral cycle in budget deficits is stronger in developing countries. Brender and Drazen
(2005) argue that opportunistic fiscal manipulation works better in “new” than in “estab-
lished” democracies because, in the former, voters are inexperienced with electoral politics
or have less information available to evaluate the fiscal manipulation. Brender (2003) and
Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004), working with local government data from Israel and
Russia, respectively, report evidence consistent with this view. On the other hand, Alt and
Lassen (2006) argue that, conditional on the degree of fiscal policy transparency, political
business cycles do exist in advanced industrialized economies. However, as Willet and Keil
(2004: 414) point out in their survey of the literature on the PBC, the micro incentives
for political business cycles have received insu!cient empirical attention.
Theoretically, the micro incentives behind the PBC are clear: PBC models with ra-
tional voters a la Rogo (1990) not only predict that politicians will try to signal their
type by distorting fiscal choices before elections, it also suggests that politicians are re-
3Some public choice scholars have pointed to an alternative explanation of the PBC: rational ignorance
of voters in the face of information costs. Instead of assuming that citizens have high levels of information
that allow them to detect and punish opportunistic politicians, they argue that many economic actors
have little incentive to be informed about economic policies and that opportunistic politicians will take
advantage of this, in particular when the percentage of uninformed voters is high (see Willet and Keil
(2004)).
4Blais and Nadeau (1992) and Rosenberg (1992) where the first to test political budgetary cycles using
local data. For an extended revision of the empirical literature about the U.S. see Besley and Case (2003).
For studies about Germany see Seitz (2000) and Galli and Rossi (2002). For Sweden see Petterson-
Lidbom (2001). Finally, see Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004) for Russia, and Drazen and Eslava (2005)
for Colombia.
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warded for doing so at the polls. In fact, the theory suggests that the vote and popularity
function and the fiscal distortion created by opportunistic politicians are jointly deter-
mined and therefore should be estimated together. Two recent studies by Akhmedov and
Zhurasvskaya (2004) and Drazen and Eslava (2005), dealing with local governments in
Russia and Colombia respectively, do estimate vote functions along side with tests for
opportunistic cycles in fiscal policy, but treat the two as being independent. To the best
of our knowledge, no study has yet taken the theory seriously and attempted to estimate
the vote function and the extent of the opportunistic political business cycle jointly as a
system of equations. The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap. We, firstly, develop a
simple model of the rational political business cycle from which we derive the two equa-
tions to be estimated. Secondly, we estimate these equations on data from 278 Portuguese
municipalities using a Full Information Maximum Likelihood system estimator.
We use data from Portuguese municipalities for several reasons. First, we have gathered
a large and detailed data set covering all mainland municipalities (278) since 1979 to 2002.
Second, the mayor is a principal decision-maker in the allocation of resources and the
distribution of investment in the municipality. Third, the institutional structure of local
governments and the policy instruments available are the same for all Portuguese localities.
Finally, election dates are fixed and exogenous from the perspective of the local authorities,
and all municipalities have elections on the same day. Taken together these factors make
this data set a very promising testing ground for a study of the interrelationship between
the VP function and the political business cycle.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some institutional information
about Portuguese municipalities. Section 3 describes the model and derives the two equa-
tions to be estimated. The data sources and the empirical strategy adopted are explained
in section 4. The empirical results obtained are presented in section 5. Finally, conclusions
are reported in section 6.
4
2 Local Government in Portugal
This section presents some background information on Portuguese municipalities. Democ-
racy was re-established in Portugal by the bloodless military coup of April 25, 1974, which
put an end to 48 years of dictatorship. Portuguese municipalities were formally established
in the Constitution of 1976 and the first municipal elections took place in December of the
same year. Portuguese local governments are responsible for improving their populations’
well-being, promoting social and economic development, territory organization, and for
supplying local public goods (water and sewage, energy, transportation, housing, health-
care, education, culture, sports, defence of the environment, and protection of the civilian
population).5
The representative branches of municipalities’ government are the Town Council and
the Municipal Assembly.6 The members of the Town Council are elected directly by voters
registered in the municipality, who vote for party or independent lists. Votes are then
transformed into mandates using the Hondt method, and the mayor is the first candidate
from the list that receives the most votes. Part of the Municipal Assembly is elected
directly by voters while the remaining members are the presidents of the councils of the
freguesias that belong to the municipality.7 The Municipal Assembly approves the general
framework for local policies, while the Town Council, which holds the executive power,
is responsible for its elaboration and implementation. The mayor is the president of the
Town Council and has a prominent role in the executive.
Budgeting rules and institutions are the same for all Portuguese mainland municipal-
ities, although the law regulating local public finances changed during the period consid-
ered.8 Municipalities are financially autonomous. They have their own employees and
assets, and they define the local budget and the plan of activities without a requirement of
authorization from a higher-ranked authority. As part of the general government sector,
local authorities are, however, subject to several control mechanisms by central government
5Law 159/99 defines the areas of intervention of Portuguese local governments.
6Law 169/99 establishes the competencies and the legal framework of municipalities’ branches.
7Freguesias are subdivisions of municipalities. They are the lowest administrative unit in Portugal.
8Law 1/79, Decree-Law 98/84, Law 1/87 and, currently, Law 42/98.
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agencies. These limit their access to revenues as well as their expenditure choices.
It is worth noting that election dates are defined exogenously from the perspective of
the local authorities and that during our sample period there was no legal restriction to
the number of terms a mayor could stand for re-election. Since the re-establishment of
Democracy in 1974, there were local elections in December of 1976, 1979, 1982, 1985, 1989,
1993, 1997 and 2001, and in October 2005.
3 Theory
In this section, we lay out a version of the rational political business cycle model developed
by Rogo (1990) and Rogo and Sibert (1988). The purpose of the exercise is, firstly, to
draw out implications of the theory which have not yet been subject to systematic testing
and, secondly, to allow theory to guide our identification strategy.
3.1 The model
We consider a simple two-period economy (w = 1> 2) populated with a continuum of citizen-
voters.9 Citizen-voters care about private consumption (fw) and two types of public goods
(j1>w and j2>w+1). As in Aidt and Dutta (2007), public good 1 (j1) is a short-term public
good while public good 2 (j2) is a long-term public good. Investments in the short-term
public good lead to immediate provision of services that can be directly observed within
the period. Investments in the long-term public good, on the other hand, lead to provision
only with a one period time lag. As a consequence, citizen-voters cannot infer how much
was invested in this good until later when they observe the provision levels generated by
past investments. The life-time utility function of a representative citizen-voter is
xy = f1 + ln j1>1 +  ln j2>1 +  (f2 + ln j1>2 +  ln j2>2) > (1)
where  5 (0> 1) is the discount factor and  is the relative importance of long-term public
goods.10 Each citizen-voter is endowed with | units of a non-storable good each period,
9The model is a simplified version of Rogo (1990).
10We assume that j2>1 = 1.
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pays the lump sum tax  w and consumes fw = |   w. Public goods are produced from tax
revenues by an elected politician using a simple linear technology:
j1>w + j2>w+1 =  w + %w (2)
where %w is a stochastic competency term. We note that the cost of investment in the
long-term public good provided in period w+ 1 is incurred in period w.
Each period a citizen-voter is elected to run the government and to produce public
goods. To simplify the analysis, we assume that  is exogenously given and that the
politician, therefore, only has to decide on the allocation of resources between the two
types of public goods. Citizen-voters dier with respect to their talent for being politicians
and some are more competent than others. Specifically, a citizen-voter is either competent
(%w = %K) or incompetent (%w = %O ? %K) as a politician. We assume that competency
is permanent, i.e., if a politician is competent in period 1 he is also competent in period
2 and vice versa. The probability that a randomly selected citizen-voter is competent is
 5 (0> 1). Politicians derive utility from private and public goods, but also care about
holding in o!ce per se because of the power or prestige that goes with it. To capture
this we assume that politicians receive the ego-rent p per period in o!ce. In addition to
competency, citizen-voters also care about the ideology of their elected politician. This
is modelled as a random shock to citizen-voters’ preference for the incumbent relative to
that of the challenger in each election. Specifically, we assume that the relative ideological
advantage of the incumbent at time w is w which is drawn before each election from a
uniform distribution on [d> e] with e  d. The ideological bias lasts for one period only
and is unrelated to competency.
The information structure of the model can best be laid out by listing the timing of
events:
1. At the beginning of period 1, the incumbent observes his competency %1 and decides
on how to allocate resources between the two public goods (j1>1> j2>2).
2. Voters observe 1 and how much is provided of the short-term public good (j1>1).
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3. At the end of period 1, an election takes place where the incumbent runs against
a randomly chosen challenger. The incumbent is reelected if he is supported by a
majority of citizen-voters; otherwise the challenger takes o!ce.
4. At the beginning of period 2, the incumbent, if reelected, decides how much to
invest in the short-term public good.11 If the challenger is elected she observes her
competency (%2) and decides on how much to invest in the short-term public good.
We notice that the incumbent in period 1 does not observe the ideological bias until
after he has decided fiscal policy for the period. This, as we shall see, implies that he cannot
be sure about the outcome of the election. He does, however, know the distribution and
that allows him to form a judgement about how close or competitive the election is going
to be.
The structure described above is a sequential game of incomplete information and the
natural solution concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). A PBE is a pair of first-
period fiscal allocations
©
jO1>w> jK1>w
ª
, one for each type, and a reelection rule for citizen-voters
(that determines the probability of reelecting the incumbent as a function of observed fiscal
policy) such that the incumbent of each type selects an optimal fiscal allocation given the
reelection rule; citizen-voters’ reelection rule is optimal given their beliefs about the type of
the incumbent and the incumbent’s strategies; and beliefs are whenever possible updated
according to Bayes’s rule. To narrow down the set of equilibria we shall impose additional
restrictions on out-of-equilibrium beliefs below.
3.2 Equilibria
We begin by noting that the optimal fiscal policy in the second period is to invest all
resources in the short-term public good and so j1>2 =  + %l irrespective of the type of the
second-period incumbent. Supposing that the first-period incumbent is reelected, we can
write the second-period utility of a citizen-voter, net of the benefit of the long-term public
11In period 2, nothing is invested in the long-term public good because it is the last period.
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good, as a function of the type of the first-period incumbent as
Z (l) = |   + ln( + %l) for l 5 {O>K}> (3)
The corresponding net second-period utility if a challenger of unknown type is elected is
Z (F) = |   +  ln( + %K) + (1 )  ln( + %O)> (4)
where F represents "challenger". If citizen-voters only cared about provision of public
goods, then it is clear from these expressions that they would reelect an incumbent who
is known to be competent for sure and boot out an incumbent who is known to be incom-
petent. However, in practice citizen-voters also care about ideology and a representative
citizen-voter casts a vote in favour of the incumbent if and only if
b (j1>1)Z (K) + (1 b (j1>1))Z (O)Z (F) + 1  0> (5)
where b (j1>1) represents the updated beliefs of citizen-voters after having observed the
first-period investment in short-term public goods. From the point of view of the first-
period incumbent, who does not observe 1 until after he has decided on fiscal policy, the
probability of getting reelected is
(b (j1>1)) = ed+ e + b (j1>1)Z (K) + (1 b (j1>1))Z (O)Z (F)d+ e (6)
which is increasing in the belief that the incumbent is competent.12 We see that the
reelection probability consists of two terms which we shall call the natural advantage and
the signalling term respectively. Following Snyder (1989) and others, we say that the
incumbent has a natural advantage in the election if, under the condition that both types
of incumbents choose the same level of spending and thus b (=) = , the probability of
reelection is greater than 1
2
. Notice that for b (=) = > we have
() =
e
d+ e
= (7)
The incumbent’s natural advantage is increasing in e and the closer e is to d the more com-
petitive or close is the election. The eect of e on the signalling term, b(j1>1)Z (K)+(13b(j1>1))Z (O)3Z (F)d+e
12We assume throughout that d is such that  5 (0> 1) for all b.
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is, on the other hand, ambiguous and depends on the sign of the nominator. If, given their
beliefs, voters expect the incumbent to deliver better outcomes than the challenger, then
a larger natural advantage reduces the marginal eect on the reelection probability of
signalling. Conversely, if voters expect the incumbent to deliver worse outcomes than
the challenger, then a larger natural advantage decreases the (negative) marginal eect of
signalling.
Faced with this reelection rule, the first-period incumbent, whether competent or not,
decides how to allocate resources between the two types of public goods taking into account
how this choice aects his reelection chances. Following Persson and Tabellini (1990,
chapter 5), it is convenient to define the following two objects: the value of reelected and
the cost of signalling. The (expected) value of being reelected for a politician of type %l is
Y (%l) = p+ (Z (l)Z (F)) = (8)
He gets the ego-rent for another period and benefits (or not) from the fact that he, in
expectation, is more (or less) e!cient at providing public goods than a randomly chosen
challenger. We assume thatp is su!ciently large to make Y (%O) A 0=The cost of signalling
is
F
¡
jl1>1> %l
¢
= ln
µ
 + %l
1 + 
¶
+  ln
µ
 ( + %l)
1 + 
¶
(9)
 ln jl1>1   ln
¡
 + %l  jl1>1
¢
=
Signaling entails a distortion of first-period resources (too much is spend on short-term
public goods and too little is spend on long-term public goods). The cost of signalling,
therefore, is the dierence between the short-run optimal allocation of first-period resources
between short- and long-term public goods and the actual choice of allocation (jl1>1).13
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium)The unique intuitive Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in un-
dominated strategies is a separating equilibrium and is characterized by the following strate-
gies and beliefs:
13With the logaritmic utility functions, the short-run optimal allocation is bjl1>1 = +%l1+ and bjl2>2 =
(+%l)
1+ .
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Figure 1: Separating Equilibria
1. An incumbent of type O sets jO1>1 =
+%O
1+ and j
O
2>2 =
(+%O)
1+ in period 1. If reelected,
he sets jO1>2 =  + %O in period 2.
2. An incumbent of type K sets jK1>1 = jv1>1 and jK2>2 =
¡
 + %K  jv1>1
¢
in period 1 where
jv1>1 = max
½
 + %K
1 + 
> jv
¾
(10)
with jv being defined as
jv = max
©
j|F (j> %O) = 
¡

¡b ¡jv1>1¢¢  ¡b ¡jO1>1¢¢¢Y (%O)ª = (11)
If reelected, he sets jK1>2 =  + %K in period 2
3. Citizen-voters’ posterior beliefs are b (j1>1) = 1 for all j1>1  jv1>1 and b (j1>1) = 0 for
all j1>1 ? jv1>1 and the reelection rule is given by equation (5).
Proof. See Appendix
The equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 1 where we have drawn the cost of signaling
and the expected value of reelection for the two types of incumbents as a function of j1>1.
The expected value of reelection is always larger for a competent than for an incompe-
tent incumbent. This is because the former can provide more second-period public goods
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than the average politician while the latter cannot. The cost of signaling is represented
by the parabolas with the competent incumbent’s cost of signaling shifted to the right
reflecting the fact that it is "cheaper" for the competent incumbent to increase spending
on the short-term public good from his short-run optimal level (+%K
1+ ) than it is for the
incompetent incumbent to match it. In a separating equilibrium, an incumbent of type
O sets jO1>1 =
+%O
1+ and prefers to do so pretending to be competent as long as j
K
1>1 is
no less than jv. An incumbent of type K, on the other hand, is, if needed, willing to
deviate upwards from his short-run optimal policy choice to signal to citizen-voters that
he is competent as long as the cost of signaling is no greater than the expected benefit
of reelection. Any jK1>1 in the interval D indicated with bold in the Figure constitute a
separating Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. It is clear, however, that jK1>1 A jv is more costly
to the competent incumbent and thus dominated by jK1>1 = jv.14 The theory therefore
predicts that fiscal policy is distorted before the election because competent politicians
need to convince rational voters that they are indeed competent. This is the Rational
Political Business Cycle (RPBC).
The extend of signalling depends among other things on the natural advantage of the
incumbent (captured by e) as shown in the next proposition.
Proposition 2 (Natural Advantage) (1) The larger the natural advantage of the incum-
bent is, the lower is the incentive of the competent incumbent to signal, i.e., jK1>1 = jv
is non-increasing in e. (2) Moreover, having a natural advantage increases the reelection
chance of all types of incumbents.
Proof. Part (1). From equation (11), we note that the degree of signalling depends on
 (1)  (0) =
Z (K)Z (O)
d+ e
which is clearly decreasing in e. It follows that gj
v
ge  0. Part (2). Notice that
(1) =
e
d+ e
+
Z (K)Z (F)
d+ e
(12)
14Since reelection is random, pooling equilibria in which both types of incumbents chose j1>1 = +%K1+
in period 1 can be ruled out by the intuitive criterion.
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(0) =
e
d+ e
+
Z (O)Z (F)
d+ e
(13)
It is immediate that C(0)Ce A 0 since Z (O)Z (F) ? 0. Calculate
C(1)
Ce
=
d (Z (K)Z (F))
(d+ e)2
= (14)
Since we assume that  (1) ? 1, it must be the case that  (Z (K)Z (F)) A d and so
C(1)
Ce A 0
The proposition shows that, ceteris paribus, the need for competent incumbents to
signal their competency is larger in situations where incumbency is not associated with
a large natural advantage. In other words, the political business cycle peaks when the
election race is "close". The reason is that the marginal value of signalling (in terms
of improved reelection chances) is higher in situations where voters are not ideologically
committed to the incumbent. The second part of the proposition shows that having a
natural advantage, ceteris paribus, improves the reelection prospect irrespective of the
type of incumbent.
We are interested in testing the relationship implied by the theory between what we
might call the (average) opportunistic distortion (RG) and the (average) win-margin of
the incumbent (ZP). Theoretically, the opportunistic distortion is given by

µ
jv(e; >  >p)
 + %K
1 + 
¶
> (15)
where jv is implicitly defined by equation (11), and is simply an ex ante measure of the
size of the average political business cycle. Theoretically, the average win-margin can be
defined as

¡b ¡jK1>1¢¢+ (1 ) ¡b ¡jO1>1¢¢ > (16)
which is the type-weighted ex ante probability that the incumbent is reelected. According
to the theory, RG andZP are jointly determined at equilibrium: the degree of signalling
along with the natural advantage of the incumbent determine the win margin, while the
win margin, through its eect on the reelection dierential between competent and incom-
petent politicians, determines the degree of signalling and thus the size of the opportunistic
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distortion. We can therefore write the structural form of the model laid out above as
ZP = 1RG + ]} (17)
RG = !1ZP +[!{> (18)
where 1> !1> } and !{ are scalars and vectors of parameters and [ and ] are (possibly
overlapping) vectors of other determinants of the opportunistic distortion and the win-
margin. The theory of the RPBC imposes restrictions on 1 and !1 which we are interested
in testing. Firstly, since the posterior belief that the incumbent is competent, b (j1>1), is
non-decreasing in j1>1, the model predicts that opportunistic behavior pays o in the
sense that the win-margin is (weakly) increasing in the size of the opportunistic distortion
(1  0). Secondly, the theory predicts that the eect of an increase in the win-margin
on the opportunistic distortion can be decomposed into two separate eects related to
signalling and to the natural advantage of the incumbent respectively. First, there is a
self-reinforcing positive link between the degree of signalling and the win-margin. To see
this, notice that starting from a hypothetical situation where jK1>1 ? jv, an increase in
jK1>1 increases (b (=)) which in turn increases the benefit of signalling (see equation (11)).
Second, an increase in the win-margin triggered by an increase in the natural advantage
of the incumbent leads to a reduction in the opportunistic distortion (see proposition 2).
Empirically, we conjecture that the second eect is more important and our null hypothesis
is that the opportunistic distortion is larger the closer the election, i.e., (!1  0).
As noted above both the win-margin and the opportunistic distortion are endogenous
variables. Accordingly, to identify the links between them empirically, we need to impose
restrictions on the structure form. We use the theory to motivate some of these exclusion
restrictions. Firstly, we note that the parameter , which controls the relative importance
of long-term versus short-term public goods, aects the opportunistic distortion directly,
while its impact on the win-margin is indirect (through its eect on the opportunistic
distortion). In particular, the larger is , the higher the cost of signaling and the lower is
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jv and, ceteris paribus, the opportunistic distortion.15 More broadly, we can interpret 
as a measure of voter awareness of the opportunity cost of spending on easily observable
expenditure items. Secondly, the availability of funds () also has a direct (positive) eect
on jv because the cost of signalling falls and the value of reelection (Y (%O)) increases,
while the eect on the win-margin is indirect. Thirdly, the ego-rent increases the benefit
of reelection and directly increases the opportunistic distortion. Based on these obser-
vations, it is reasonable to exclude factors that aect voter awareness, the availability
of funds and the ego-rent from the equation for the win-margin (ZP). On the other
hand, the opportunistic distortion is unlikely to be directly aected by general economic
conditions, while these factors are likely to aect the win-margin directly. We shall build
on this identification strategy in the empirical specification below and defined [ and ]
accordingly.
4 Data and Empirical Specification
The data set consists of political, financial and economic variables for the 278 Portuguese
mainland municipalities, for the local election years of 1979, 1982, 1985, 1989, 1993, 1997
and 2001.16 Municipal election dates and results were obtained from the Technical Sta
for Matters Concerning the Electoral Process (Secretariado Técnico dos Assuntos para o
Processo Eleitoral - STAPE) of the Internal Aairs Ministry. Data on municipal local
accounts were obtained from the local authority’s (Direcção Geral das Autarquias Locais -
DGAL) annual publication called Finanças Municipais (Municipal Finances). This report
15Dierentiating equation (9) with respect to  gives:
CF(=> %O)
C
= ln
µ
 ( + %O)
1 + 
¶
 ln ( + %O  jv) +
1
 (1 + )
A 0=
This implies that Cj
v
C ? 0. Since
(+%K)
1+ also decreases in , the overall eect on the opportunistic
distortion is ambiguous.
16Although there was also an election in October 2005, data on the municipal financial accounts is only
available until 2003. The election of 1979 is not covered in several estimations (whenever lags, term means
or deviations from term means are included). For the three municipalities created in 1997 (Odivelas, Trofa
and Vizela) there is only election data for 2001 (the last election in our sample), which means that there
is no data for the votes obtained in the previous elections. Thus, in the estimations, we have a maximum
of 275 municipalities.
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exists from 1979 to 1983 and from 1986 to 2003. For the two missing years data was
obtained directly from the municipalities’ o!cial accounts and are incomplete: we have
182 observations for 1984 and 189 for 1985. The consumer price index and the national
unemployment rate were taken from the OECD’s Main Economic Indicators. Data on
the total number of employees in firms within each municipality and on their average
wages, from 1985 to 2003, was obtained from the “Quadros de Pessoal” database, of the
Portuguese Ministry of Labour and Social Solidarity (MTSS).17 Finally, demographic data
was obtained from the National Statistics O!ce (INE).
As discussed above, our empirical model consists of a system of two simultaneous
equations: a vote and popularity function represented by the win-margin and an equation
for the opportunistic distortion. We measure the win-margin of the incumbent as the
dierence between the vote share of the mayor’s party and that of the largest opposition
party (ZP). We measure the opportunistic distortion (RG) as the percentage deviation
of investment expenditures (LH) from the election term average.
Since RPBC are more likely to occur in budgetary items whose timing of implemen-
tation is controlled by the mayor and are visible to the electorate, we concentrate our
analysis on investment expenditures. Local governments do not have much freedom to
set revenue instruments, as transfers from the central governments represent their main
source of funding, particularly in the earlier years of the sample, and they all have access
to the same type of taxes. Regarding spending decisions, current expenditures are strongly
conditioned by salaries that are regulated by rigid labor contracts, both in terms of dura-
tion and wage rates, not leaving much flexibility to be changed before elections. Capital
expenditures include transfers to lower levels of government and investment expenditures.
It is therefore, likely that opportunistic behaviour occurs trough investment decisions.18
Based on the discussion of exclusion restrictions above, we can expand equations (17)
17The “Quadros de Pessoal” is a yearly mandatory employment survey that covers virtually all privately
owned firms employing paid labor in Portugal (public servants and own employment are not included).
Although the most recent year for which data is available is 2003, there is no data on wages for 2001. In
order to avoid missing values, for each municipality, we set the wages for 2001 equal to the simple average
between those of 2000 and 2002.
18For a detailed description of municipal finances in Portugal and for results indicating that opportunism
occurs in investment expenditures, see Veiga and Veiga (2007).
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and (18) as follows:
ZPlw = 1RGlw + 2LHlw + 3\Plw + 4UUlw (19)
+5ZPl>w31 + 6JSlw + 7Hpslw
+8Zdjhvlw + l + w + lw
RGlw = !1ZPlw + !2LHlw + !3\Plw + !4UUlw (20)
+!5FWwplw + !6{FWlw + !7Srs65lw
+!8SrsGhqvlw + !9Uljkwlw + l + *w + lw
where l = 1> =====> 275 is the index for municipalities and w indicates election years.19 Both
equations include municipal fixed eects (l and  l) and election year fixed eects (*w and
w). 1 to 8 and !1 to !9 are parameters to be estimated and lw and lw are random
error terms with H(lw) = H (lw) = 0. Our main objective is to estimate jointly the eect
of opportunism (RG) on the win-margin (ZP) and the eect of the win-margin on the
degree of opportunism. The theoretical analysis suggests that 1 A 0 and !1 ? 0.
We divide the exogenous variables into three groups. The first group contains three
variables that are included in both equations. They are: average investment expenditures
during the election term preceding the election of year w (LH); the number of years the
incumbent mayor has been in o!ce (\P); and a dummy variable equal to 1 if the in-
cumbent mayor runs for reelection and 0 otherwise (UU). We expect that low average
investment expenditures (LH) make it easier to be opportunistic and to create a large per-
centage deviation of investment expenditures from the average at election times (!2 ? 0).
We also expect that average investment expenditures are positively related to the win-
margin as voters reward mayors for keeping investments high on average throughout the
term (2 A 0). We expect that the number of years the incumbent mayor has served
(\P) reduces the win-margin because, as documented by e.g., Mueller (1970), Frey and
Schneider (1978) and Veiga and Veiga (2004a), popularity tends to erode with time in
o!ce (3 ? 0) and that mayors with longer tenures are more experienced and so are more
19The election years are 1979, 1982, 1985, 1989, 1993, 1997 and 2001.
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able to manage investment expenditures opportunistically (!3 A 0). Finally, we expect
that mayors who do not run for reelection (UU = 0) are unwilling to incur the cost of
signalling and thus would not attempt to increase investments opportunistically (!4 A 0).
Likewise, the party of the incumbent mayor is expected to do better when the mayor runs
for reelection than when a new, often unknown, candidate is presented (4 A 0).
The second group contains variables that are excluded from the equation for the win-
margin. Firstly, it includes two variables which are directly related to the availability
of funds, namely the average capital transfer from the national government during the
preceding election term (FWwp) and the election year change in the capital transfer ({FW ).
Theory suggests that the availability of funds, here represented transfers, increases the
opportunistic distortion in election years without having a direct eect on the win-margin.
We expect that !5 and !6 are positive. Secondly, the second group also includes two
variables that are related to voter awareness which, as suggested by the theory, tends to
reduce the magnitude of the political business cycle. Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004)
in their study of the budget cycle in Russian regions use education and urbanization to
measure voter awareness. Unfortunately, data on education attainment at the municipality
level are not available for the time period analyzed in this paper. But, in Portugal, older
people have, on average, much less education than younger people. Thus, we can use
the percentage of the population over 65 years of age (Srs65) to proxy for low average
education levels20 and use population density (SrsGhqv) to proxy for urbanization. We
expect Srs65 to be associated with low and SrsGhqv to be associated with high levels of
voter awareness and we predict that !7 A 0 and !8 ? 0. Finally, this group also includes
a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the mayor belongs to a right-wing party (Uljkw).
We have no prior on the sign of !9.
The third group contains variables that are excluded from the equation for the oppor-
tunistic distortion. According to Carsey and Wright (1998), the electorate may wish to
reward, or punish, the national government in second tier (local) elections. Since voters
tend to punish the national government for bad economic outcomes,21 higher unemploy-
20The same applies to the illiteracy rate, which will also be used in the empirical analysis.
21For evidence on the Portuguese case, at the national level, see Veiga and Veiga (2004a and 2004b).
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ment rates should lead to a lower percentage of votes for incumbent mayors who belong
to same party as the national government. We capture this with the variable JS which is
the interaction between a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the mayor belongs to
the same party as the prime minister of Portugal and the national unemployment rate. A
negative sign is expected for 6. Since voters are expected to reward mayors who achieve
high levels of municipal employment (Hps) or high average municipal real wages (Zdjhv)
during their tenure, we also expect 7 and 8 to be positive. Finally, we include the win-
margin in the pervious election (ZPl>w31). This variable picks up unobserved factors such
as the mayor’s personal characteristics and ideology and party a!liation of voters. We
expect persistence in voter preferences (and thus in voting behavior) and predict that 5
is positive.
Descriptive statistics for all the variables included in the empirical model are presented
in Table 1. Since the Win-margin measures the dierence in the percentage of votes
between the incumbent and his main opponent, it assumes negative values in case of
defeat. The Win-margin in the previous election must be positive, since it refers to the
results obtained by the incumbent mayor. In some cases, the percentage deviation of
investment expenditures from their term mean assumes negative values, indicating that
not all mayors behave opportunistically.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
5 Results
The results of the estimation of equations (19) and (20) as a system of simultaneous
equations, using the Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) method,22 are reported
in Table 2. T-statistics are shown in parenthesis and the levels of statistical significance
of the estimated coe!cients are signalled with asterisks. The number of observations and
For a survey of the international literature, see Paldam (2004).
22FIML is the asymptotically e!cient estimator for linear and nonlinear simultaneous models, under
the assumption that the disturbances are multivariate normal. When this assumption fails, FIML may
still be asymptotically e!cient.
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the adjusted R-squared for each equation are also reported. Finally, at the foot of the
Table, the dummy variables used to control for geographical and time specific eects are
indicated.23.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
There is clear support for the main prediction of the RPBC model: opportunism pays
o, as the opportunistic distortion (RG) has a statistically significant positive eect on the
win-margin in all four specifications of equation (19), and the win-margin (ZP) has the
expected negative eect on the size of the opportunistic distortion in all four specifications
of equation (20). In other words, the data strongly support the prediction that incumbent
politicians can increase their reelection chances by inflating spending in the year before
an election and that they have most reason or incentive to do so when they expect the
election race to be close or when they are lagging behind their main opponent in the polls.
Opportunistic behavior is minimized when the incumbent expect a comfortable victory
margin.
Concerning the magnitude of the eects, a one-point increase in the opportunistic
distortion (RG), increases the win-margin (ZP) by approximately 0.05 points, while a
one-point increase in the win-margin decreases the opportunistic distortion by 0.3 points.
Although the first eect may seem small, if the mayor, in the election year, doubles in-
vestment expenditures relative to their term mean, the win-margin increases by 5 points,
which could be the dierence between winning and losing in a close election. The sec-
ond eect implies that a one-standard deviation increase in the win-margin decreases the
opportunistic distortion by roughly 6 points.
Our estimates also give support to some of the secondary hypotheses. Firstly, from the
estimates of equation (19) there is evidence that the win-margin is persistent, that time in
23The specifications reported in the first two columns include dummy variables for municipalities (mu-
nicipal fixed eects) and election years. In order to check if results were sensitive to the geographical
dummies chosen, two alternatives were implemented. First, in column 3, dummies for districts replaced
the municipal fixed eects (there are 18 districts in mainland Portugal). Second, in column 4, we included
dummy variables for three of the four population categories that, according to the Portuguese law, are
used to determine the mayors’ wages: (1) Lisbon and Porto; (2) other municipalities with population
above 40,000 inhabitants; (3) municipalities with population above 10,000 and below 40,000 (the dummy
left out is that for the small municipalities, with a population below 10,000 inhabitants)
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o!ce reduces the win-margin, that the mayor’s party does better when the incumbent runs
for re-election, and that mayors belonging to the same party as the national government are
penalized in municipal elections for high national unemployment.24 Municipal employment
(Hps) and average real wages (Zdjhv) turned out not to be statistically significant in
the specification reported in column 1. Since the inclusion of these variables reduces the
sample size substantially, because data on employment and wages are available only from
1985 onwards, we decided to exclude them from the specifications reported in the following
columns.25
Secondly, from the estimation of equation (20), we note that the data support the
hypothesis that opportunism is greater when the incumbent runs for re-election, when she
belongs to a left-wing party (Right=0), and when there are increases in capital transfers
from the central government in the election year. But, opportunism does not seem to
depend on the average investment expenditures over the term, on whether or not the
mayor’s party controls a majority of deputies in the Municipal Assembly, on the average
capital transfers over the term, or on the proxies for voter awareness (percentage of the
population over 65 years old and population density).26
To check the robustness of these results, we report in Table 3 results for an alternative
specification where we use the level of investment expenditures in the election year instead
of the percentage deviation of investment expenditures from their election term average
as a measure of the opportunistic distortion. Since the former is highly correlated with
the election term average, the later variable was excluded from equation (19). In equation
(20), investment expenditures in the previous year replaces the term average of those
expenditures, in order to account better for the persistence in this series.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Results are very similar to those of Table 2. Again, opportunism pays o, as higher
investment expenditures in the election year lead to a larger win-margin for the incumbent
24This eect is, however, not significant in the specification reported in column 1.
25The number of observations rises from 1214 to 1465 (an increase of 17.1%), and Wald tests allow the
exclusion of these variables.
26Results are the same when the illiteracy rate is used instead.
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party (equation (19)). Also as expected, investment expenditures in the election year are
larger the smaller the (expected) win-margin is (equation (20)). The major dierences in
results from those of Table 2 are that there is less evidence that opportunism depends on
whether or not the mayor runs for re-election or on her ideology, and that the election
term average of capital transfers is now always highly statistically significant.27
6 Conclusion
Building on the literatures of political business cycles and vote/popularity functions, this
paper presents a theoretical model and empirical tests which combine the two sides of
the interaction between economics and politics. A voting function and an equation for
the determinants of opportunistic economic policies are estimated as a system of two
simultaneous equations, using the Full Information Maximum Likelihood method, for a
sample comprising 275 Portuguese municipalities and covering the period 1979-2001.
Empirical results clearly support the hypothesis that opportunism pays o, as greater
expenditures in the election year (when compared to the term mean or, simply in euros
per capita) lead to greater vote dierences between the incumbent and her main opponent.
Regarding the vote function equation, there is also evidence of persistence in vote dier-
ences, of negative eects of time in o!ce, that the mayor’s party does better when the
incumbent runs for re-election, and that the government’s party is penalized in municipal
elections for higher national unemployment.
The hypothesis that the magnitude of opportunism is inversely proportional to the
estimated win-margin also receives empirical support. Thus, the opportunistic distortion
is smaller when the incumbent expects to win by a comfortable margin, and is greater when
the election is close or if the incumbent lags behind her main opponent. Opportunism will
also be greater when the incumbent runs for re-election, when she belongs to a left-wing
27Results are very similar when the estimations of Tables 2 and 3 are performed using capital expendi-
tures instead of investment expenditures. The same is true for the categories of the latter for which Veiga
and Veiga (2007) found greater evidence of opportunistic political business cycles, such as Overpasses,
streets and complementary works. As expected, results are much weaker for total expenditures, for which
the above-mentioned authors found little evidence of opportunistic manipulation. These results are not
shown here, but are available from the authors upon request.
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party, and when there are increases in capital transfers from the central government in the
election year.
7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1 We start by constructing the set of separating equilibria and
then impose restrictions on out-of-equilibrium beliefs to narrow down the set down to a
singleton and to rule out pooling equilibria. Let
©
jO1>1> jK1>1
ª
denote candidate first-period
equilibrium strategies of the two types of incumbents with jO1>1 6= jK1>1. Firstly, in any
separating equilibrium an incumbent of type Omust chose the short-run optimal allocation
of first-period resources, i.e., jO1>1 =
+%O
1+ . Thus, Bayes’s rule implies that b³ +%O1+´ = 0.
Under the assumption that citizen-voters hold pessimistic out-of-equilibrium beliefs in the
sense that for any j1>1 6= jK1>1, b (j1>1) = 0, it would not be beneficial for an incumbent of
type O to pretend to be of type K if
F
¡
jK1>1> %O
¢
  ( (1)  (0))Y (%O) = (21)
Moreover, an incumbent of type K prefers to play jK1>1 rather than his short-run optimal
choice +%K
1+ if
F
¡
jK1>1> %K
¢
  ( (1)  (0))Y (%K) = (22)
Notice that these the two intervals overlap, that any jK1>1 within this intersection is a
separating PBE and that the intersection may contain +%K
1+ . Call the intersection D.
Since for j1>1 5 D an incumbent of type K is worse o the further away jK1>1 is from
+%K
1+ ,
all separating equilibria within D are dominated by jK1>1 = jv (defined in equation (11))
and can be ruled out by assuming that citizen-voters hold the (out-of-equilibrium) belief
that the incumbent is of type K for all j1>1 5 D. Pooling equilibria in which both types
set j1>1 = +%K1+ can be ruled out by the intuitive criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987) as in
Rogo (1990).
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Name Variable
Abbreviation
Obs. Mean Stand. 
Dev.
Min. Max.
Win-Margin (vote difference) WM 1889 14.49 20.28 -72.62 87.93
Win-Margin in the previous election WMt-1 1897 19.32 14.64 0.02 87.93
Investment Expenditures InvExp 1772 182.69 137.28 5.04 1439.10
Investment Expenditures (Term Mean) IE 1623 162.35 105.02 14.13 944.52
Opportunistic Distortion: % Deviation 
of Investment Expenditures from 
their Term Mean 
OD 1500 13.96 30.31 -88.55 169.34
Average Real Wages Wages 1367 515.32 115.65 290.67 1196.98
Capital Transfers (Term Mean) CTtm 1623 129.53 92.54 16.97 879.48
% Change in Capital Transfers (From 
Previous Year) 
ǻCT 1522 10.82 40.30 -87.38 287.56
Government’s Party GovParty 1893 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00
Government’s Party * Unemployment 
Rate
GP 1897 2.79 3.28 0.00 9.17
Illiteracy Rate IR 1897 19.35 8.63 3.75 54.98
Municipal Employment Emp 1367 15.09 9.73 1.04 89.73
Population Density PopDens 1897 2.82 9.05 0.06 112.75
% Population Over 65 Years Old Pop65 1897 16.98 5.68 5.35 41.22
Right Right 1897 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00
Run for Re-election RR 1813 0.80 0.40 0.00 1.00
Unemployment Rate (National) Unemp 1897 6.45 1.54 4.07 9.17
Years Mayor YM 1893 7.01 4.61 1.00 25.00
Sources: DGAL, INE, MTSS, OECD, STAPE. 
Table 2: Opportunism and Vote Difference 
Votes 1 2 3 4
Equation (1): Win-margin 
Opportunistic distortion (% Deviation 
of Investment Expenditures from 
their Term Mean) 
.045 
(1.79)* 
.053 
(2.01)** 
.059 
(2.09)** 
.058 
(2.11)** 
Investment Expenditures (Term Mean) -.002 
(-.34) 
.007 
(1.56) 
.010 
(1.87)* 
.007 
(1.41) 
Years Mayor -.442 
(-4.14)*** 
-.378 
(-3.59)*** 
-.389 
(-3.64)*** 
-.348 
(-3.29)*** 
Run for Re-election 8.668 
(6.49)*** 
8.963 
(6.80)*** 
9.208 
(6.92)*** 
8.852 
(6.69)*** 
Win-margin in previous election 58.282 
(16.9)*** 
43.660 
(16.6)*** 
42.254 
(16.2)*** 
43.114 
(16.7)*** 
Government’s Party * Unemployment 
Rate
.005 
(.03) 
-.542 
(-3.69)*** 
-.503 
(-3.22)*** 
-.554 
(-3.72)*** 
Municipal Employment .038 
(.77) 
Average Real Wages -.002 
(-.36) 
# Observations 1214 1465 1465 1465 
Adjusted R2 .24 .18 .19 .17
Equation (2): Opportunistic distortion 
(% Deviation of Investment 
Expenditures from their Term Mean)
Win-margin -.308 
(-3.34)*** 
-.277 
(-2.71)*** 
-.267 
(-2.25)** 
-.286 
(-2.67)*** 
Investment Expenditures (term mean) -.015 
(-1.23) 
-.008 
(-.76) 
-.003 
(-.28) 
-.002 
(-.23) 
Years Mayor -.072 
(-.48) 
-.046 
(-.34) 
-.103 
(-.75) 
-.075 
(-.55) 
Run for Re-election 4.041 
(1.92)* 
4.979 
(2.54)*** 
4.576 
(2.19)** 
4.969 
(2.48)** 
Capital Transfers (Term Mean) .014
(.82) 
.006 
(.44) 
-.0004 
(-.03) 
-.014 
(-1.15) 
% Change in Capital Transfers (From 
Previous Year) 
.379 
(25.3)*** 
.373 
(27.5)*** 
.375 
(26.3)*** 
.375 
(26.9)*** 
% Population Over 65 Years Old .133 
(.69) 
.110 
(.72) 
.269 
(1.49) 
.215 
(1.56) 
Population Density .143 
(1.56) 
.124 
(1.55) 
.062 
(.72) 
.063 
(.76) 
Right -5.368 
(-3.58)*** 
-5.315 
(-3.94)*** 
-4.567 
(-2.94)*** 
-4.667 
(-3.59)*** 
# Observations 1214 1465 1465 1465 
Adjusted R2 .36 .37 .36 .36
Specific Effects Dummies: 
Municipal dummies X X
District dummies X
Population category dummies X
Election dummies X X X X
Sources: DGAL, INE, MTSS, OECD, STAPE. 
Notes: System of simultaneous equations estimated by FIML, controlling for geographic and time 
specific effects as indicated at the foot of the table. Models estimated with a constant in each 
equation. T-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: 
***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%. 
Table 3: Investment and Vote Difference 
Votes 1 2 3 4
Equation (1): Win-margin 
Opportunistic distortion (Investment 
Expenditures) 
.007 
(1.80)* 
.004 
(2.14)** 
.016 
(3.76)*** 
.012 
(2.62)*** 
Years Mayor -.432 
(-4.03)*** 
-.406 
(-3.77)*** 
-.442 
(-4.16)*** 
-.379 
(-3.62)*** 
Run for Re-election 8.568 
(6.60)*** 
8.832 
(6.66)*** 
9.287 
(7.06)*** 
9.001 
(6.83)*** 
Win-margin in previous election 52.788 
(16.1)*** 
39.611 
(15.9)*** 
41.963 
(15.8)*** 
44.032 
(16.9)*** 
Government’s Party * Unemployment 
Rate
.061 
(.38) 
-.595 
(-3.98)*** 
-.413 
(-2.65)*** 
-.578 
(-3.83)*** 
Municipal Employment .063 
(1.32) 
Average Real Wages .002
(.42) 
# Observations 1212 1463 1463 1463 
Adjusted R2 .21 .18 .19 .17
Equation (2): Opportunistic distortion 
(Investment Expenditures) 
Win-margin -.466 
(-2.18)** 
-.477 
(-2.11)** 
-.448 
(-2.00)** 
-.678 
(-2.74)*** 
Investment Expenditures (-1) .606 
(29.9)*** 
.604 
(38.9)*** 
.616 
(41.5)*** 
.658 
(48.2)*** 
Years Mayor .409
(1.18) 
-.045 
(-.14) 
.571 
(1.72)* 
.469 
(1.33) 
Run for Re-election 6.135 
(1.02) 
7.468 
(1.36) 
8.610 
(1.56) 
11.199 
(1.88)* 
Capital Transfers (Term Mean) .564
(18.2)*** 
.622 
(36.3)*** 
.594 
(32.4)*** 
.572 
(32.4)*** 
% Change in Capital Transfers (From 
Previous Year) 
1.099 
(37.4)*** 
1.026 
(38.5)*** 
1.050 
(35.1)*** 
1.082 
(36.7)*** 
% Population Over 65 Years Old .381 
(.98) 
-.496 
(-1.72)* 
-.345 
(-1.08) 
-.340 
(-.93) 
Population Density .321 
(1.50) 
.297 
(1.35) 
.283 
(1.31) 
-.149 
(-.41) 
Right -3.454 
(-.92) 
-4.431 
(-1.29) 
-6.895 
(-1.99)** 
-7.313 
(-2.17)** 
# Observations 1212 1463 1463 1463 
Adjusted R2 .83 .82 .82 .82
Specific Effects Dummies: 
Municipal dummies X X
District dummies X
Population category dummies X
Election dummies X X X X
Sources: DGAL, INE, MTSS, OECD, STAPE. 
Notes: System of simultaneous equations estimated by FIML, controlling for geographic and time 
specific effects as indicated at the foot of the table. Models estimated with a constant in each 
equation. T-statistics are in parenthesis. Significance level at which the null hypothesis is rejected: 
***, 1%; **, 5%, and *, 10%.
